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1Introduction : The Critical Importance of the Soviet 
Role in Vietnam's Economic Reforms - Fact or Fallacy ?
At its Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986, a 
drastic leadership change occurred in the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV).1 Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Le Due Tho 
all stepped down from top Party positions, accepting most of 
the blame for the country's appalling socio-economic condition. 
The new leadership that replaced them, led by Nguyen Van 
Linh, is now faced with the task of reforming the country's 
ailing economy.
To do this, it has embarked on a wide-ranging series of 
economic reforms. As these reforms gain momentum in the 
second half of the 1980s, it has seen the concomitant rise of a 
new class of leaders in the Politburo labelled as "reformers",2 
the most prominent of whom are the country ' s  new leader, 
Nguyen Van Linh, and the State Planning Commission 
Chairman. Vo Van Kiet.3
At the same time, the new Soviet leader,  Mikhail 
Gorbachev, has been attempting to reform his country's own 
inefficient economy through a process known as perestroika  
(reconstruction). He has extended this to include the economies 
of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (CMEA),^ of 
which Vietnam is a member.
These two facts - the ascendancy of the reformist  
programme in Vietnam and Gorbachev's efforts at perestroika  
in the CMEA - have given r i se to speculations that Soviet 
p re ssu re  was ins t rumenta l  in the pace and di rect ion of
2Vietnam's economic reforms.5 The unspoken premise on which 
they are based seems to be that Vietnam's current heavy 
dependence on aid from the Soviet Union, both economic and 
military, has "bought" the latter significant leverage over the 
Vietnamese leadership, and that this has allowed it to pressure 
Vietnam into reforming its economy according to Soviet wishes. 
From this, it has been a small step to constructing arguments 
that the new leaders in Vietnam are heavily Soviet 
"influenced" ,6 the corollary being that the acceleration in 
reforms since the Sixth Congress has more to do with external 
pressures from the Soviet Union than with internal factors.
How much currency is there to such arguments ? Are 
they facts, based on rational and intelligent assessments of 
domestic Vietnamese political realities, or fallacies, derived 
from facile assumptions about economic and military aid 
necessarily "buying" active and meaningful influence - in the 
sense of an ability to exercise direct and substantial control - 
for its giver over a recipient state ? Or is the truth to be found 
somewhere in between, with a conjunction of internal and 
external factors acting as the catalysts for the Vietnamese 
reform process ? And if so. which is the key and necessary 
factor - internal upheaval or external stimulus ?
These are the central questions in the sub-thesis. To 
answer them, an investigation of the domestic context under 
which the reforms have taken place must be carried out. The 
following needs to be clarified : first, given that the country's 
economy had been inefficient - as it evidently was - without a 
long series of economic crises since the end of the Second
3Indochina war, would the reforms be as urgent as they are 
now ? ; and second, what is the basis of the Party's legitimacy ? 
The answers to these two questions w ill te ll us something 
about the character of its leadership (tuned to fighting a war 
and independent-minded), and why economic reforms may 
have become necessary in purely domestic po litica l terms 
(legitimacy).
More important, they help to illum inate a related and 
crucial question : could such explanations reasonably account 
for the increasing pace of reforms - and the rise of the so- 
called "reformers" in Vietnam - without resorting to ascribing a 
central role to the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's programme of 
perestroika. ? If the answer to this is a "yes", it would give the 
lie - although not necessarily conclusive ly7 - to any 
unchallenged statements about the Soviet Union's critical role 
in Vietnam's economic reforms, "critical" in the sense that had 
it not been for Soviet intervention, the Vietnamese by 
themselves would not have carried out reforms in the way or 
at the pace that they did and are doing, nor would the 
"reformers" have risen within the hierarchy of the Party. If the 
answer is in the negative, it could in turn indicate that the 
Soviets did play a c ritica l part in the reform process in 
Vietnam, and from it, an argument could be made that they are 
indeed strengthening their influence there.
Whatever the answers to these queries, it  would be 
d iff ic u lt to gainsay that the Soviet presence in Vietnam is 
increasing, or that it has passive influence there insofar as this 
relates to its ability to threaten a withdrawal of aid if the latter
4does not accede to its wishes. But does it necessarily follow 
then that active and meaningful Soviet influence in Vietnam is 
a foregone conclusion ?
To decide this issue, it is imperative that the relationship 
between Gorbachev's p e re s t ro ik a  in the CMEA and the 
Vietnamese economic reforms be put to the test of intellectual 
rigour. It needs to be subjected to vigorous examination based 
on em pirical evidence, not on unsupported and vague 
speculations about its nature. If it stands up to the test, 
meaning that it can be established beyond reasonable doubt 
that Gorbachev's perestroika affected the Vietnamese reforms 
d irec tly  and in a way which implies a strong element of 
compulsion, then one would be led to the conclusion that the 
Soviet's role is indeed critical in every sense of the word. If not 
- unless one accepts without question the premise that aid 
must necessarily and always "buy" active and meaningful 
influence - the verdict about the degree of Soviet influence, 
and hence how critical it is on Vietnam's economic reforms, can 
only be left open to widely differing interpretations, each of 
which would probably have as much cred ib ility  as the others, 
depending on the level of cynicism their advocates wish to 
bring to their understanding of the nature of the Vietnamese- 
Soviet relationship.
The logic developed thus far in this introductory chapter 
defines the parameters of analysis for th is sub-thesis. 
Therefore, it begins with a study of the internal dynamics of 
the current reforms in Vietnam, and is followed by an 
assessment of the link between the Gorbachev reforms and the
5Vietnamese case. The arguments drawn from them will then be 
weighed against each other to determine more precisely, and as 
objectively as possible, what is most likely to be the "correct" 
answer - given the evidence at hand - to the question posed in 
the title of this sub-thesis : "The critical importance of the 
Soviet role in Vietnam's economic reforms - fact or fallacy ?"
l i t  is also commonly known by the other name, the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP). This sub-thesis will use the name Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CPV) uniformly throughout, except when the former 
name is used during quotes taken verbatim from other sources. In such 
cases, it will be left unchanged.
2As opposed to "conservatives" who are against, or are not enthusiastic 
about, the economic reforms.
3ln March 1988. Kiet was named the acting Premier to replace Pham 
Hung who had died of a heart attack. ("Passage - Died : Pham Hung". 
Asiaweek. 25 March 1988. p. 71.) His own replacement as the Chairman 
of the State Planning Commission - Dau Ngoc Xuan - was named in April 
1988. (Murray Hiebert. "Vietnam Names Two New Economic Ministers". 
FEER. 7 April 1988. p. 14.)
^Dusan Pirec. " "Perestrojka" in the CMEA ", Review of International 
Affairs. Vol. XXXV111. No. 904. 5 December 1987. See also Gorbachev's 
speech to the 43rd extraordinary session of the CMEA where he stressed 
that, “there is a serious need for the CMEA to be restructured. More 
efficient forms and methods of running the national economy are 
being worked out...(to) enable each CMEA member country to reveal 
more fully its internal possibilities.“ ("Gorbachev Receives CMEA 
Delegates : Ryzhkov Addresses Reception“, SWB-SU. 16 October 1987. 
SU/8700/A2/1.) The CMEA is also known by its other acronym. Comecon. 
In this sub-thesis, the former term is preferred.
^This underlies a lot of the reporting on Vietnam's economic reforms in 
the media, especially ever since Gorbachev started applying his 
programme of perestroika to the CMEA. See. for example, the regular 
reports in the Far Eastern Economic Review, which in recent years had 
published three cover stories on Vietnam's efforts at economic reforms : 
"Vietnam : Prisoners of the Past", FEER. 8 November 1984. pp. 25 - 32 ; 
"Vietnam : Emerging from the Past ?". FEER. 23 July 1987. pp. 26 -31  ; 
and "Vietnam : Slow Progress". FEER. 17 March 1988. pp. 20 - 23. Other 
reports are also found in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s country 
surveys on Indochina. Country Report - Indochina : Vietnam. Laos. 
Cambodia. London (Quarterly), and Country Profile - Indochina : 
Vietnam. Laos. Cambodia. London (Annually) : Asiaweek ; the British 
Broadcasting Corporation's Summary of World Broadcast - Far Fast ; and 
the United States' Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Asia Pacific.
6For example, this seems to be implicit in Thai Quang Trung's paper. 
"Hanoi's Outlook and the Gorbachev Effect", presented at an 
international conference on “The Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific 
Region", held at York Hotel. Singapore. 25 - 28 May 1987. and organized
6by the Singapore institute of International Affairs. According to him. 
there is supposedly strong Soviet influence in Vietnam through 
Moscow's "close links" with just under half of the CPV's Politburo 
members. The "Soviet connection" as claimed by him is made through 
the following Politburo members : Do Muoi, Vo Van Kiet. Mai Chi Tho. 
Dao Duy Tung (alternate member), Le Due Anh and Doan Khue. (ibid., p. 
8.) However, the only evidence he presents for such assertions seem 
extremely weak - that these leaders have made high level visits to 
Moscow, or that they have received training in the Soviet Union. These 
do not necessarily mean that they are "pro-Soviet".
7See explanation in the next two paragraphs of the main text.
7Chapter One : The Domestic Factor.
Can a case be made that it was principally internal 
pressures that forced the pace of economic reforms and led to 
the rise of the "reformers" in Vietnam?
To begin, there is incontrovertible evidence that in the 
twelve months preceding the watershed Sixth National Party 
Congress in December 1986, the living conditions in the country 
were actually falling below those attained in previous years. 
The availability of food, something which would affect the lives 
of the majority of ordinary Vietnamese in a very immediate 
and direct way, provided the best index of this. The highest 
average annual yield of rice, the staple food crop which 
accounts for up to "83 per cent of the calories, 67 per cent of 
the protein, and 33 per cent of the vitamin B 1"1 in the 
Vietnamese diet, was dismal. According to the Vietnamese 
themselves, it was "only 28.5 metric quintals per hectare, one 
of the lowest in the world. The production of subsidiary food 
crops on the whole declined,...(with the output for 1986) lower 
than in 1980."2 In addition, the consumption levels of meat, 
eggs and fish that year were - almost unbelievably - "40 per 
cent lower...than in I960."3
These figures in themselves do not say much about the 
declining standard of living. But the Hanoi-based Vietnam 
Courier, publishing, an article on the numerous problems 
besetting the country’s food sector, translated what they meant 
for the ordinary Vietnamese, "The fact that food availability 
per head of the population is now 304 kilos testifies to great
8effort, yet it is a very low figure, which is a bare minimum and 
approaching the limits of hunger."4
Unless the Vietnamese have got their arithmetic seriously 
wrong, and there is as yet some unknown political advantage 
for the communist leadership in allowing fabricated and untrue 
reports of misery in their country to be published from Hanoi 
itself, there is litt le  reason to doubt the veracity of the above 
figures and the extremely frank admission of near-starvation 
levels in post-War Vietnam.5 In fact, the ir statistics are 
corroborated by independent sources. Illustrating the level of 
malnutrition in Vietnam, a 1986 UNICEF study estimated that 
the general Vietnamese population received an "average daily 
ration of 1,800 to 1,900 calories, about 400 calories short of the 
minimum daily requirement."6
What is v ita lly  important about this aspect of the 
deteriorating situation in Vietnam is not the mere fact of it per 
se, but that it was the continuation of a long series of economic 
crises in the country’s post-War history which had turned 
economic policy formulation into an ad hoc exercise, with each 
crisis bringing a change in direction, only to be abandoned or 
severely modified by the next impending one.
The details of the swings and shifts in economic policies 
are not the main concern of this sub-thesis.7 What is germane, 
however, is the effect that they must have had on the 
legitimacy of the Party over the past decade. Based on the 
definition of legitimacy as developed by Seymour Martin Lipset 
- namely, "the capacity of (a) system to engender and maintain
9the belief that the existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones of the society (in which they are found)"8 - 
the prolonged bouts of economic crises could only have served 
to undermine the "appropriateness" of the CPV insofar as this 
relates to the management of the post-War economy.
To show whether this contention is supportable, it 
becomes necessary first to define clearly the foundation on 
which the Party's legitimacy was built.
It would be uncontroversial to state that two goals - 
independence from the French (anti-colonialism) and social 
revolution (anti-feudalism) - lay at the heart of the Party's 
legitimacy. As expressed in the political theses of the 
Indochinese Communist Party, the precursor of today's CPV. 
prepared by its first Secretary-General Tran Phu and delivered 
at its inaugural Central Committee plenum in October 1930. 
"(t )he essential aim (of the Party) is on the one hand to do 
away with the feudal vestiges and the mode of pre-capitalist 
exploitation, and to carry out a thorough agrarian revolution ; 
on the other hand, to overthrow French imperialism and 
achieve complete independence for Indochina.'^
These aims have been maintained cons is ten t ly  
throughout the history of the Party. When the French were 
defeated in 1954, the focus for the independence struggle 
shifted to the Americans. In a communique released on 22 
August 1953 , the Party reiterated its aim to read. "The 
immediate task of the entire Vietnam Lao Dong Party (the CPV) 
and the entire Vietnamese people is...to oppose the American
10
imperialists and their agents, to strive to achieve national 
unification."10 That is, although the enemy had changed, the 
goal of independence remained the same, this time through the 
reunification of North and South.
The organization that was subsequently established in 
1960 to carry out the communist struggle in the South - the 
National Front for Liberation - professed the same aim. Its 
manifesto read, "The South Viet Nam National Front for 
Liberation calls on the entire people to unite and heroically rise 
up as one man to fight along the line of a program of 
action...(t)o overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the US 
imperialist and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration - 
the lackey of the United States - and to form a national 
democratic coalition administration.“11
On the CPV's first  aim - independence - the Party 
leadership clearly tied nationalism and communism together 
by using the sophist argument that a patriot is a communist. Flo 
Chi Minh had declared in 1951 that "(g)enuine patriotism 
is...part and parcel of (socialist) internationalism."12 Nine years 
later, Pham Hung argued for support using almost exactly the 
same rationale when he said, "In our country, to be a patriot 
means to love socialism, patriotism is closely linked with 
socialism, and the communist is the most genuine patriot."^
Significantly, a lot of those who became members of the 
communist movement did so because of patriotism. William 
Duiker, who studied how the communists came to power in 
Vietnam, wrote, "Interviews with prisoners and defectors show
that those who joined the NLF (National Liberation Front, 
sometimes also known as the National Front for Liberation) did 
so for a variety of reasons...Most cited, (inter  alia), 
patriotism...as their reason for joining...Members who joined 
before 1954 frequently mentioned patriotism as the primary 
reason."14 As to the Party's second aim - social revolution - he 
concluded, "A key factor in the Party's ability to mobilize 
support within Vietnam was the success of its effort to link the 
force of nationalism with that of social reform."^
Duiker's observations seem to be corroborated by the 
Party's own version of Vietnam's history. An officially 
sanctioned account published in 1974, highlighting and 
embellishing the CPV's role in ousting the French and the then 
continuing resistance against the Americans, proudly noted 
that the Party's political theses "was the first time a party 
(had) explici t ly joined the national question (that is, 
independence) to the peasant question (namely, social 
revolution through land reform)."16
From the above, there are two levels on which to 
understand how the legitimacy of the Party, acquired from its 
victories in the independence struggle and the promise of social 
reforms, is being undermined by the successive economic crises 
that have followed since.
On a superficial level, the end of the war itself could have 
contributed to it. During the war, there was a willingness to 
sacrifice for the sake of patriotism. As noted by Nguyen Khac 
Vien, a prominent Party member when writing about the
12
economic climate of the war years, "The system of economic 
management was...entirely devoted to the war effort...In this 
situation, the peasants did not really sell their produce to the 
State, but delivered it as a patriotic duty...(A) spirit of self- 
sacrifice prevailed."17
With the war over, it would not be unreasonable to 
assume that the Vietnamese expected a better life, at least 
relative to the deprivations of the war-years .18 But the 
perpetual sense of hardship provoked by having to live a life of 
"bare minimum...approaching the limits of hunger" - a decade 
after the end of the reunification war - must have seem 
untenable to even the most patriotic Vietnamese.
On a more profound level, the sense that the Party was 
losing its “appropriateness" was reinforced by the reasons that 
laid behind the economic crises - inefficiency, mismanagement 
and corruption. For example, the blame for the continuing 
dismal state of agriculture,10 although partly attributable to 
natural disasters and pest infestation,20 also rested with these 
reasons. To give just one instance, corruption created a loss of 
between "5 and 10 per cent of the (state-supplied) fertilizers, 
petrol and oil reserved for intensive crop cultivation at each 
successive level", beginning from the provinces, to the districts, 
and finally down to the villages.21 This meant that by the time 
supplies reached the level of the villages, namely, those people 
who are the end-user, only 75 to 85 per cent of them were left 
for actual crop cultivation, with 15 to 25 per cent being 
pilfered for personal use or sale on the black market. The 
severity of these corrupt practices is underlined by the fact
13
that the "amount of fertilizer (and) insecticide...apportioned to 
agriculture...(was already falling) short of its needs."22
More importantly, the crisis-situation in agriculture was 
widely duplicated in areas which could not be blamed on 
natural disasters or pests at all, but which could only have 
resulted from debilitating inefficiency, serious mismanagement, 
and/or corruption of near-epidemic proportions among Party 
and State officials. The statistics speak for themselves : in early 
1988, it was estimated that on average, only 30 per cent of the 
production capacity of Vietnam's 3.300 state industrial 
enterprises was used28 ; in September 1983. an attempt at 
monetary reform was badly implemented,24 resulting in an 
inflation rate for 1986 of between 500 and 700 per cent25 ; and 
"in 1986 and the first half of (1987), 1,223 (corruption) cases 
were investigated, and 79 per cent of them...tried."26 Of these 
cases of "appropriation of public property, speculation, 
smuggling (and) bribery,...77 per cent of the persons involved 
(were) government employees, including 37 directors or 
deputy directors of state-owned corporations, factories and 
enterprises, captains and deputy skippers of ocean-going ships, 
(a) district chairman and officials of equal ranks."27
Considering that these same factors, especially corruption, 
contributed significantly to the erosion of the Saigon regime's 
legitimacy - with the result that many of the disillusioned 
joined the communist movement28 - there is little reason to 
suppose that the CPV is in some way "immune" to similar 
disaffection among those who had supported it during the war. 
The inefficiency and mismanagement were making the goals of
14
socialism - one of the two central planks of the CPV's past 
legitimacy - seem less likely than ever. Socialism is supposed to 
"lessen the pressure of want ; lighten the amount of labour by 
means of which any given schedule of wants can be satisfied ; 
and...make labour more agreeable."29 None of these seem even 
remotely achievable given Vietnam's present state of economic 
health. Worse still, top-ranking cadres of the Party were 
showing themselves to be no better than the corrupt Saigon 
officials that they had replaced.
There is evidence from as early as 1980 that "the masses" 
were no longer willing to put up with the appalling situation 
for much longer. In 1978. Vietnam suffered an extremely poor 
harvest plus serious problems in its economy. Compared to 
1976. the first year of the second Five-Year Plan (1976 - 80). 
production of food grain fell from 13 to 11 million tons.30 Three 
million people - 13 per cent of the working population - were 
also unemployed.3i in 1980. the rising discontent broke out 
into food riots and peasant unrest in Nghe Tinh and around 
Haiphong.32
By 1986. plagued by another serious economic crisis, "the 
country (was) in the midst of a self-criticism campaign which 
charged that many Party leaders were corrupt, out of touch 
with the people and unable to solve the country's economic 
problems."33 in March, the Party Central Committee Secretariat 
issued a directive for convening local (provincial and cities) 
congresses "to review the draft Political Report" for the 
upcoming Sixth Party Congress.34 This was followed in April by 
a second directive setting the guidelines for "criticism" on two
15
levels - first, of the "quality and style of leadership and cadre 
policy" ; and second, on the "understanding (of) Party lines and 
viewpoints, and...the organization of their implementation."35 
The response from the local congresses was unambiguous - the 
widespread inefficiency, mismanagement and corruption of 
Party officials at provincial and city levels were strongly
condemned.36
The top Party leadership was also coming under question. 
In the 23 March edition of the newspaper Saigon Giai Phong, 
there were suggestions that Le Duan should be removed, and 
earlier reports compared him unfavourably with Ho Chi 
Minh.37
In 1987, with the economic situation showing no 
improvement,38 the new Party leadership, like its predecessor, 
was again openly criticized for it. A communique released after 
the fourth plenum of the Sixth Congress Central Committee, 
held from 8 - 1 7  December 1987, stated clearly that "(t)he 
Politburo, the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers must be 
held responsible for the slow change in the (economic) 
situation."39
The sceptic could of course ask, "Why should the 
communist authorities be concerned ?" After all, the obvious 
disaffection was unlikely to pose any serious threat to the 
Party's political supremacy : the only other institution capable 
of challenging its monopolistic power - the military - is heavily 
controlled.
16
In 1983, a "new (Party) leadership mechanism" over the 
military reaffirmed this control. Two of its main principles 
were that "(t)he Party Central Committee, through the direct 
and permanent agency of the Political Bureau, shall exert 
direct, centralized and unified leadership over the VPA 
(Vietnam People's Army) in all respects"40 ; and that "(t)he 
appointment of cadres, including commanders and political 
directors, from the divisional or equivalent echelon upwards, as 
well as the designation of military council members of all 
echelons, must be approved by the Political Bureau and 
Secretariat of the CPV Central Committee."41 The former 
guarantees Party scrutiny of all military activities, whereas the 
latter ensures that only officers loyal to the Party would be 
appointed to positions of influence within the military.
In addition, a Party man leads the top decision-making 
body in the military - the National Defence Council. According 
to the new constitution adopted by the National Assembly on 
18 December 1980, the chairman of the State Council is 
concurrently the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and 
head of the National Defence Council.42 The current chairman of 
the State Council is Politburo member Vo Chi Cong, elected to 
the post at the first session of the eighth National Assembly in 
June 1987,43 thus making him the head of the National Defence 
Council. Another Party man, Nguyen Van Linh, leads the 
Military Commission of the CPV,44 a powerful body which 
exercises vast control over nearly every aspect of the Army's 
functioning 45
17
With the military under such extensive control, any 
opposition to Party rule created by the economic crises would 
have to come from other organized groups. Anti-communist 
Vietnamese opposition "movements" do exist overseas. 
According to Nguyen Hoang Cuong, a lecturer in the Macarthur 
Institute in Australia, the three most prominent "movements" 
are those found in the United States (started by Hoang Co Minh, 
a former admiral in the Vietnamese navy until 1975) ; 
Australia (set up by Vo Dai Ton, a former colonel in the 
Vietnamese army who returned to Vietnam from Australia in 
1982 and was captured by the Pathet Lao and sent to Hanoi) ; 
and France (co-founded by Tran Van Ba and Le Quoc Quan, 
both executed in Saigon in January 1985).46 Recently, these 
"movements" have started to organize small-scaled "invasions" 
of Vietnam.47 Some opposition groups probably exist at home 
too. with cases of sporadic fighting against the communist 
regime being reported 48
However, there is little or no indication that these 
"movements" or groups are organized enough, or have the 
capability - as the military clearly does - to pose any serious 
threat to the supremacy of the Party. Therefore, unless reliable 
and independently verifiable information to the contrary 
becomes available, a sceptic could claim, with some 
justification, that the "loss of legitimacy" as described above 
does not represent any real source of internal pressure for 
reforms insofar as this relates to compelling reasons why they 
should be carried out.
There are two replies to such an argument.
18
First, it ignores one thing most analysts of the 
Vietnamese political scene would find hard to dispute - the 
commitment of the Party’s top echelon, that is, the Politburo, to 
socialism. In spite of the economic reforms which seem to 
contradict some of the very basic principles of the "socialist 
e t h i c s " , the goal of socialism has never been abandoned. At 
the last National Party Congress, which put the country firmly 
on course for even greater and more iconoclastic reforms, this 
remains unchanged. The two new "strategic tasks" enunciated 
in the opening paragraph of the Political Report presented by 
the outgoing Party Secretary-General Truong Chinh were, 
"(h)aving defeated the US aggressors, completed the liberation 
of the Homeland (and) achieved national reunification, our 
Party has led the people of the whole country to enter the new 
stage of revolution, that of building socialism and defending the 
Homeland.”50 This commitment of the leadership to socialism 
would in itself create strong internal pressures within the 
Politburo for reforms to be implemented so as to ensure that 
Vietnam's "transition to socialism" is not derailed by perpetual 
economic failures.
Second, and more importantly, although the Party's 
institutional supremacy may not be threatened, its leaders' 
positions are. Top-ranking Party officials have had to resign for 
economic failures before. "In 1956, two Politburo members, 
including the Party's First Secretary (Truong Chinh), stepped 
down in the wake of failures associated with agricultural 
collectivization. In 1982, six Politburo members retired at the 
Fifth Congress."5i But the difference in recent times is that this
19
has accelerated, creating great pressure on those at the top to 
arrest the economy’s declining state of health or face being 
removed.
The trend became clearly discernible in the last twelve 
months before the Sixth Congress, a period when the 
Vietnamese people, as described in the earlier part of this 
chapter, have had to endure a great deal of hardship because of 
the economic crisis. Tran Phuong, the vice-premier who 
implemented the ill-fated monetary reform of September 
1985. was dismissed in January 198652 ; at the mid-year tenth 
plenum of the Fifth Congress, To Huu, the immediate superior 
of Tran Phuong. was relieved of his post as the Council of 
Ministers' vice-chairman in charge of economic affairs53 : in 
June, just three days before the National Assembly was 
scheduled to meet, the State Council issued a decree dismissing 
six ministers,54 of which five were from ministries directly or 
indirectly involved in the running of the economy.55 The 
director of the National Bank was also dismissed.56
Finally, the the old leadership was removed at the 
watershed Sixth Party Congress. There, three of the top leaders 
of the revolution - Truong Chinh (then aged 79), Pham Van 
Dong (80) and Le Due Tho (76) - all stepped down5? ; To Huu, 
who earlier in May had already been dismissed as the Council 
of Ministers' vice-premier in charge of economic affairs, was 
dropped from the Politburo58 : and the Defence Minister Van 
Tien Dung, whose wife was reported to have been involved in a 
major corruption scandal,59 was also ousted.60 The Party 
Secretariat, "which implements Politburo decisions and runs
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the country on a day-to-day basis,' '61 and was thus also 
responsible for the economic difficulties, was left with only 
three of its members appointed at the Fifth Congress,62 with 
eight new members being added.63 At a slightly lower level, 
"nearly half" of those who lost their positions on the Central 
Committee were "ministers or vice-ministers in government 
ministries dealing with some aspect of Vietnam's economy."64
This second factor - the growing unacceptability of 
economic mismanagement and other related shortcomings in 
post-War Vietnam - represents the greatest source of internal 
pressure on the communist leaders to carry out reforms : the 
fear of losing power to others within the Party. This is simply 
because no matter how united a facade the Party leadership 
may try to present to the outside world,65 it is perhaps 
inevitable that some degree of conflict would exist in any 
political system.
In Vietnam’s case, it is extremely difficult to determine 
precisely who is ranged against whom, or how clear cut the 
"reformist-conservative" divide within the leadership really is, 
because of its secretive style. In the words of Carlyle Thayer, a 
specialist in Vietnamese politics, "Vietnam...is a closed and 
secretive one-party state which carefully regulates contact 
between outsiders and its citizens. The press and electronic 
media are carefully controlled to reflect the official Party line. 
In the absence of legal pressure groups, opposition spokesmen 
and a free press, it is all but impossible to discern...informed 
Vietnamese opinion."66
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However, in the post-Sixth Congress era, most within the 
Politburo seem to have accepted the need for greater economic 
reforms. Even those reputed to be "hard-line conservatives" 
have all made conciliatory statements about their necessity. For 
example, Pham Hung and Dao Duy Tung were both supposedly 
"hard-line conservatives". From 1980 until June 1987, when he 
was named the Premier, Hung was the Interior Minister, a post 
that was usually associated w ith "conservative" views,67 
whereas Tung is the Party ideologue, another reputed bastion 
of "conservative" ideas. But in 1987, it was reported that "(a)t a 
M in istry of Information conference held in summer, (Tung) 
was e n tire ly  behind the new line of "openness" and 
renovation."68 And in a speech marking the 42nd anniversary 
of the August revolution, Hung im p lic itly  acknowledged the 
necessity for reforms by noting that, "(t)he fundamental issue 
for us is to eliminate the system of bureaucratic centralism and 
state subsidies."60 Later, speaking at a national conference on 
economic reforms held by the Council of Ministers in late 1987, 
he also stated that, "to make fuller use of the capabilities of the 
enterprises and to ensure their effective operations, they must 
have broader autonomy in the implementation of the ir 
tasks",70 thus in effect lending support to the decentralization 
efforts of the "reformers".
The volte-face of these two "conservative" leaders may 
have been brought about not by conviction, but from a lack of 
choice. If they do not at least pay lip service to the necessity 
for reforms, they could lose their positions in any Politburo 
"power struggle", considering that the prevalent mood in the
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country is clearly against letting the post-War economic 
malaise continue.
Any "power struggle" along "reformist-conservative" lines 
that could have been provoked within the leadership by 
disagreements about the reforms is, however, not the main 
theme of this sub-thesis, and thus, will not be analysed in 
detail here. Instead, its primary aim is to determine whether it 
is possible to explain the accelerating pace of reforms - and the 
rise of the "reformers" - principally on the basis of the 
pressures created through the erosion of legitimacy and 
support for the Party by the economic crises.
To attempt an explanation along these lines, it should be 
noted first that there seems little doubt that the fall from 
power of Party officials in the run-up to and during the Sixth 
Congress was directly tied to economic failure. With respect to 
the "retirement" of Chinh, Dong and Tho, the official reason 
given was their "advanced age and failing health . " 71 Even 
though there is probably some truth to this considering their 
ages, it seems indisputable that it was their patent inability to 
manage the economy that precipitated their departure. In the 
draft resolution of the Sixth Congress, they bore the brunt of 
the blame for the country's economic difficulties when it was 
stated quite unequivocally that, "(W)e have not yet fulfilled the 
general objectives set out by the Fifth CPV Congress, that is, to 
stabilize the basic socio-economic situation and improve the 
people's daily life...(T)he subjective cause of this situation was 
due to the various shortcomings and errors in leadership."72
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The "purge" of the Party apparatus and Central 
Committee could be similarly explained : the Political Report 
directly implicated virtually the entire top echelon of the Party 
for the leadership's "various shortcomings and errors". To quote 
the report, "The Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the 
Secretariat and the Council of Ministers were pr imarily 
responsible for the...errors and shortcomings in the Party 
leadership. "73
In early 1988, Nguyen Van Linh confirmed that the 
"purge" against those who have failed or are resistant to the 
economic reforms is continuing. In an interview with the 
foreign press on 21 January 1988, when asked about 
opposition to economic reforms in Vietnam, he replied. "After 
the Sixth Congress, a good number of vice-premiers and 
ministers were removed because their outdated thinking was 
damaging the economy. Those who refused to change their way 
of thinking and work style will have to go if they are bent on 
putting obstacles in the way of renovation."74
On 10 May 1988, Radio Hanoi announced that Nguyen 
Ngoc Triu (Agriculture Minister), Nguyen Van Chinh (Food 
Minister) and Doan Duy Thanh (Foreign Trade Minister) had 
lost their titles as deputy premiers.?5 The former two also lost 
their portfolios and were reassigned to other jobs.76 Radio 
Hanoi gave no reasons for the action,77 but the fact that their 
ministries dealt with food production - in Thanh's case, with 
the import of food - and that there was a continuing food crisis 
in 1988 makes it reasonable to infer that it was economic 
failure, as reflected in the food crisis, which accounted for it.
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However, although the economic crises were the apparent 
and immediate reason for the "retirements" at the Sixth 
Congress and the continuing "purges" since then, the 
underlying "push" seems to have been generated by a deeper 
concern about its deleterious effect on the Party's support 
among the masses. Explaining why the crisis-situation could no 
longer be tolerated, the Political Report noted, "(this)...state of 
affairs (in the economy) has lessened the confidence of the 
masses in the Party leadership and in the functioning of state 
organs."78
This appears to be a continuing concern of the post-Sixth 
Congress leadership. Du Muoi wrote an article in the October 
1987 issue of the Party's theoretical journal, Tap Chi Cons San 
(Communist Review), pointing out the effect corruption was 
having on the Party's standing. According to him. "(n)egativism 
(the CPV's euphemism for corruption and other undesirable 
practices) has become a very serious social and political 
issue...(A)t present, negativism has become a major obstacle to 
the implementation of the Party's leadership...(It has, inter 
alia), reduced the masses' trust in the Party...and seriously 
affected the relationship between our Party and state and the 
people."79
It follows that if there was a genuine desire to regain "the 
masses' trust", the Party would have to revitalize the country's 
moribund economy, and clean up the Party and State 
machinery. These two aims fit in with the pattern of events in 
Vietnam.
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The former explains the contrasting fortunes of those 
who favour reforms, or who have had successful economic 
records, v is -a-v is  those removed in the turbulent period 
before, during and after the Sixth Party Congress.
Before the Sixth Congress, in the June 1986 ministerial 
reshuffle, the replacements for the M inistry of Foreign Trade 
and the National Bank - both important economic institutions - 
had displayed a preference for reforms and possessed a 
successful managerial record respectively : the new Minister of 
Foreign Trade, Doan Duy Thanh "was the firs t to experiment 
with the "output contract" system in agriculture,"80 and the 
new governor of the National Bank, Luu Minh Chau, had 
"headed Ho Chi M inh’s h igh ly successful im port-export 
company."81
At the Congress, the promotions made were sim ilar. 
Three people identified as having clear preferences for reforms 
moved up within the Politburo hierarchy : Nguyen Van Linh (to 
the top job of Party Secretary-General) ; Vo Van Kiet (Chairman 
of the State Planning Commission, to number five) and Nguyen 
Co Thach (Foreign M inister, from alternate status to fu ll 
member at number eight).82 In addition, Nguyen Thanh Binh, 
also thought to support reforms,88 was promoted to the 
Politburo at the number eleven position.M Vo Chi Cong, 
believed to be cautiously supportive of reforms,88 rose from 
the seventh position to number three.86
After the Congress, the "reformers" have continued to 
rise, the most noticeable being Vo Van Kiet. He was named as
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the acting Premier after Pham Hung died on 10 March 1988 of 
a heart attack.87 Although he failed to be confirmed in the post 
at the June 1988 National Assembly88 - as most analysts had 
expected him to be8^  - an indication of his growing prominence 
was that at Hung's funeral, his name was placed at the number 
three position in the lis t of leaders attending, after Linh and 
Cong, even though on the official Politburo list, he is ranked 
behind another member, namely, Du Muoi.90 All these people, 
favouring reforms and having the "right'' experience, would be 
best suited to "save" the economy and prevent further damage 
to the Party's support among "the masses".
The latter aim - the need to clean up the Party and State 
machinery - also explains recent "campaigns" and Politburo 
resolutions and legislations passed by the National Assembly.
First, the CPV's new Secretary-General Nguyen Van Linh, 
probably rea liz ing that the Party's support was being 
undermined by the widespread inefficiency, mismanagement 
and corruption, has personally started a media campaign 
against these ills. In May 1987, he began writing anonymously 
and under the acronym of "N.V.L." a series of highly critica l 
articles entitled "Things Which Must Be Done Immediately" in 
Nhan Dan, the official Party daily, attacking the decay in the 
Party and State apparatus.9i Five months later, at a meeting of 
Vietnamese journalists and artists where he finally admitted to 
the authorship of these artic les,92 he called for more open 
criticism of the failings of those in power by saying, "Ours is a 
ruling Party. The law governing its survival and development 
dictates that the Party re ly on and consider the people as the
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roots. When not yet in power, our Party clung to and relied on 
the masses for its survival. After seizing power, it would be 
easy for the Party to commit the shortcoming of abandoning, 
oppressing and stealing from the masses, and to contract the 
maladies of bureaucratism and peremptoriness in providing 
economic and ideological leadership. These shortcomings should 
be roundly criticized and condemned."93
By "going public" in this fashion, Linh may be attempting 
to use the media to reach over the heads of entrenched 
bureaucratic interests. In a speech delivered to the first session 
of the eighth National Assembly in June 1987, he had 
recognized that the spirit of reforms endorsed at the Sixth 
Party Congress was meeting with resistance. In a particularly 
telling paragraph, he admitted that "the voice of the highest 
representatives of the people (that is. the National Assembly) 
was not always and in all circumstances respected. Some 
people accepted the criticisms (in support of the reforms) but 
later would do nothing or would act as they saw fit. In not a 
few instances, written proposals by the National Assembly 
were sent to some state organs or leading official asking them 
to clarify or settle some matter, only to be filed away and left 
untouched year after year, allegedly for "study"."94
To overcome such resistance, a public campaign started in 
the official CPV paper would show the seriousness of the 
leadership's support for it, and help mobilize “the masses" 
against the widespread mismanagement, corruption and 
inefficiency in the Party and State apparatus, thus forcing them 
to change their ways. As the Hanoi-based Vietnam Courier put
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it when explaining the role of the news media in the campaign, 
"(i)t is not by accident that openness, criticism and self- 
criticism...are now outstanding features of...the Vietnamese
press."95
Its should however be noted that the articles could 
possibly also be symptomatic of resistance from other Party 
leaders to the reforms. If so, they could then be construed as 
attempts to get popular support from the cadres and "the 
masses" for reforms, thus pressuring unenthusiastic leaders to 
take a more conciliatory line to secure their own positions at 
any future Party Congress, remembering that three of the top 
leaders had already fallen as a result of the economic crises.
Linh has also initiated an internal campaign to clean up 
the Party and State machinery. On 12 September 1987, the 
Politburo issued a resolution known as "The Campaign to Purify 
Party Organizations and the State Apparatus and Increase their 
Fighting Strength, and to Make for Healthy Social Relations". 
Noted as a "political event of special importance",96 the 
campaign was defined by the Vietnamese as follows. "(F)irst of 
all, we must expel from (the Party organizations and State 
organs) all depraved and degenerate elements. We should 
change those cadres who are not resolved to carry out reforms 
in the spirit of the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress, and 
those who are not equal to their tasks. We should mete out due 
punishment to those guilty of serious errors and mistakes, 
depending on the nature and seriousness of their errors and 
mistakes. With regard to Party members whose political 
standards are too low and who do not have the confidence of
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the masses, we should, by taking the proper measures in a 
continuous process, get them out of the Party."07
Finally, Linh has attempted to bring the power of the law 
behind his efforts to "clean up" the Party and State apparatus. 
He implicitly acknowledged that the lack of clearly defined 
responsibilities was part of the reason for corruption when he 
told the first session of the eighth National Assembly in June 
1987 that, "we are still a long way from a comprehensive and 
uniform legal system, especially in the field of economic 
legislations...The sluggishness and casual way in which much of 
our activity is conducted is due in no small measure to the lack 
of legal criteria and standards."08
In this respect, reform measures aimed at defining more 
clearly the responsibilities of state economic enterprises versus 
state central planning organs - as in the Council of Ministers' 
December 1987 decision No. 217-HDBT00 - may be explained as 
part of a drive against corruption. Although the most 
immediate aim of the decision was to ensure the autonomy of 
state economic enterprises vis-a-vis state central planning 
organs100 - which is in line with the ongoing decentralization 
efforts - delineating unambiguously what the state central 
planning agencies can and cannot do also serves to cut down 
the opportunities for corruption and abuses of power by its 
officers, something for which they had been severely criticized 
before. For instance, at the 21 - 25 October 1986 "bloc" 
congress of the central planning agencies, a speech delivered 
by the secretary of the Party Central Committee Nguyen Lam - 
who is also the head of the Central Committee's Economic
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Department - had chided them for "a tendency...to be 
preoccupied with seeking personal interests....to disregard or 
neglect compliance with the state policies and system of 
economic management."101
Those who still doubt the above explanations for the 
reforms and the rise of "reformers" in Vietnam could, of course, 
dispute whether they genuinely arose from concern within the 
Party about the loss of legitimacy. Their riposte could be that 
the reforms and rise of the "reformers" may have nothing to do 
with trying to prevent an erosion of support for the Party : the 
draft resolution and Political Report of the Sixth Congress could 
be no more than convenient covers to mask a "power struggle" 
within the leadership in which the "old guard” lost.
For example, the editorial in the monthly anti-communist 
newsletter published by the National United Front for the 
Liberation of Vietnam (NUFRONL1V) called into question the 
"reformist" character of the Linh leadership when it stated. "In 
reality, there is no such thing as a "reformist" or a 
"conservative" bent of mind among the ranks of those ageing 
communists - Linh is 74. Pham Hung 75. and Vo Chi Cong 71. In 
fact, they have been members of the Communist Party for 
more than half a century. The current turmoil in Viet Nam is 
only the result of a turnover of power...These so-called 
"reforms" or "modernization programs" as proclaimed by 
Nguyen Van Linh represent only desperate efforts of the new 
Viet Cong leaders to safeguard their newly acquired powers...If 
they fail to purge the suspected members of the bureaucracy 
and to replace them with their trusted followers, the new
31
leadership under Nguyen Van Linh would not survive...(T)hese 
so-called "reformists" should be viewed for what they really 
are : they are just a bunch of new-leaders-in-the-process-of- 
power-consolidation."102
The simple rebuttal to this would be to point out that it 
has never been discounted that a "power struggle" could have 
existed w ithin the leadership, as conceded earlier. However, 
this in no way undermines the importance of economic failure, 
and the resulting erosion of legitimacy, as an explanation for 
the fall of the old leadership and the rise of the "reformers", 
because unless the challengers had an issue w ith which to 
remove the old leaders, it would have been extremely d ifficu lt 
to do so given that the latter are eminence grises of the 
revolution. Economic failure is, on the evidence available, the 
only real issue that could be used against the old leadership. 
Why economic failure is an issue is, of course, directly related 
to the threat of mass starvation, as documented at the 
beginning of this chapter ; and flowing from it, a political price 
that a leadership responsible for it cannot forever avoid 
paying.
Furthermore, if it was just a "power struggle", it does not 
adequately explain why reforms were actually carried out, 
which they undeniably have been since September 1979 ; the 
need to "re-legitimize" Party rule does explain this, and in a 
most comprehensive and coherent fashion too.
Therefore, from a ll the arguments and evidence 
presented in this chapter - the declining standard of living, the
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sense that the Party was becoming "inappropriate" for the task 
of post-War economic reconstruction, the link between 
economic failure and the fall of the old leadership, and the 
need to make the Party "appropriate" again explaining most 
succinctly the recent events in Vietnam - a strong case can be 
made that it was internal pressures that forced the pace of 
reforms and facilitated the rise of the "reformers" in Vietnam.
However, two questions still remain, "Where then does 
the role of the Soviet Union fit in ?" and "How critical is it to the 
reformist programme ?". This sub-thesis now attempts to 
answer them.
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Chapter Two ; The Soviet Factor.
There are two things which need to be briefly established 
at the outset : why the Soviets want CMEA member-states to 
carry out economic reforms,1 and why Vietnam is an especially 
worrying case for them in this respect.
First, the inefficiency of CMEA industries, brought about 
by their protection from competition, had caused them to use 
more Soviet-supplied "hard-currency" earning resources - 
mainly oil and other raw materials - than in comparable 
industries in the West. In addition, the quality of their products 
had generally been inferior, making them difficult to sell on the 
world-markets to earn the "hard-currency" needed to buy 
essential raw materials.2
The net effect of these two factors is that the Soviets 
have ended up heavily subsidizing the CMEA. Not only have 
they had to make up for the shortfall in raw materials needed 
by the CMEA industries with their own "hard currency" earning 
resources ; they have also had to absorb most of the "soft" 
goods - that is, inferior quality products - rejected by the West 
in return for their economic assistance.
However, up "(u)ntil the end of the 1970s, Soviet 
authorities never claimed that they were helping or subsidizing 
their partners."3 Instead, the emphasis was on the mutuality of 
benefits derived from economic cooperation within the CMEA.4 
But with the Soviet Union now trying to reform its own 
economy and facing a shortage of "hard currency" reserves to 
pay for its increasing levels of trade with the West, the need to
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conserve its own scarce supplies of "hard-currency" earning 
resources and to reduce the subsidization element of its 
economic assistance to CMEA member-states have become 
peremptory.
To do this, Gorbachev has been pressuring them to cut 
down on waste and inefficiency, and to improve the quality of 
their products.5 At the 43rd extraordinary session of the CMEA 
in October 1987, he speech noted that, "there is a serious need 
for the CMEA to be restructured. More efficient forms and 
methods of running the national economy are being worked 
out...(to) enable each CMEA member country to reveal more 
fully its internal possibilities."6
In Vietnam's case, a lot of the Soviet aid it receives had 
been squandered through the kind of inefficiency which the 
Gorbachev leadership is trying to reduce in the CMEA. In 
commemorating the treaty between Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union, the former admitted that, "(o)ver the year, the USSR has 
provided billions of roubles in aid to our people. But due to our 
system of bureaucratic centralism and state subsidies, our 
subjectivism and hastiness, as well as our conservatism and 
procrastination, we have wasted this valuable source of Soviet 
aid."7
The quality of the goods it sends back to the Soviet Union 
in repayment of loans and other forms of economic assistance 
had also been found wanting in many respects. The Vietnamese 
Army paper. Ouan Doi Nhan Dan, reported that Vietnam is “still 
unable to implement satisfactorily the agreements and
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contracts signed (with the Soviet Union) in terms of quantity, 
quality and deadlines,...(and that) Vietnamese rubber exported 
to the USSR was poor both in terms of quality and packaging."8
Finally, Vietnam also represents a considerable drain on 
Soviet "hard-currency" earning resources and reserves.
First, there has been a substantial rise in its imports of 
petroleum and related products - bought at a highly subsidized 
rate0 - from the Soviet Union. In the 1976 - 1980 period, the 
value of such products was only 140.3 million roubles, or 8.2 
per cent of the total value of Soviet goods exported to 
Vietnam.10 For the 1981 - 1984 period, it has risen to 1,186.3 
million roubles, or 34.5 per cent of the total value of Soviet 
exports to Vietnam.11 In the 1976 - 1980 period, as a 
percentage of the total value of Soviet goods exported to 
Vietnam, the category "petroleum and petroleum products" 
ranked fif th .12 In the 1981 - 84 period, it had became the 
largest category.18
Second, the Soviets have had to use their own "hard- 
currency" reserves to pay for the grain which they send to 
chronically food-shortage ridden Vietnam. For example, in the 
latest food crisis in Vietnam in 1988, the Soviets have had to 
buy 60,000 tonnes of food on the world market to help it.14
Based on the above points, the Soviets have very good 
reasons to want Vietnam to carry out economic reforms, and 
there seems little doubt that they are exerting pressure on the 
latter in this regard. At the CPV's Fifth Party Congress in 1982, 
Gorbachev, who headed the Soviet delegation, had already
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called on the Vietnamese to use "in a more rational way the 
production potential already built" with Soviet assistance in 
Vietnam.l5 Stressing that "further economic cooperation (would 
have to be) in line with the actual possibilities of the USSR and 
SRV, " 16 and that "the economy must be economical, " 17 his point 
was c learly  that the future of Soviet aid depended on the 
Vietnamese economy becoming more efficient.
With Gorbachev now in power and strenuously pursuing 
perestroika, at home and in the CMEA, the amount of Soviet 
pressure must have increased, not only for reforms, but for 
Soviet-styled reforms in Vietnam. At the Sixth Party Congress 
of the CPV, the speech delivered by Yegor Ligachev, a senior 
member of the CPSU Politburo and head of the Soviet 
delegation, implied as much by the offer he made to his 
Vietnamese hosts. Devoting a large part of his speech to 
supporting the reforms in the Soviet Union, he said, "We know 
that the Vietnamese communists take a great interest in the 
practice of the bu ild ing of socialism in the USSR and the 
restructuring process which we are implementing. We are 
w illing to share with you all the experience accumulated by the 
Soviet communists. " 18
Having established, albeit in a brief fashion, that the 
Soviets have good reasons to want Vietnam to carry out 
reforms, and that they are exerting pressure on the latter in 
this respect, the crucial question with which to start analysing 
the role of the Soviets in Vietnam's economic reforms - and 
how critical it is - is to ask, "On what basis can claims that the 
Soviets are actually having active and meaningful influence on
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the Vietnamese reforms be made ?" After all, exerting pressure 
is evidently not equivalent to successfully obtaining active and 
meaningful influence ; assuming that it is in no way makes it 
the case.
To support claims of active and meaningful Soviet 
influence, most would point to Vietnam's dependence on 
economic and technical aid from the Soviet Union, something 
which has been escalating steadily over the years.10 After 
formal Soviet-Vietnamese economic ties were established on 
18 Ju ly 1955 by Ho Chi Minh in Moscow, Soviet aid for 
Vietnam's firs t Five-Year Plan (1961 - 65) was estimated to be 
worth between US$ 50 and 108 m illio n .20 By the time of 
Vietnam's second Five-Year Plan (1976 - 80), it had risen to a 
value of between US$3 and 4 b illion .21 More recently, Soviet 
aid in Vietnam's th ird Five-Year Plan (1981 - 85) was “twice 
that in the preceding five-year period,"22 and the amount 
projected for the current Five-Year Plan (1986 - 90) w ill be 
"more than double" that of the 1981 - 85 plan.23
The Soviet contribution as a percentage of the total 
amount of foreign aid which Vietnam receives is even more 
telling. In 1976, the Soviet Union accounted for about 45 per 
cent of the overseas aid Vietnam received.24 By the end of 
1978, w ith the Kampuchean invasion causing China and the 
West to cut off aid, Moscow took over almost all of the funding 
for Vietnam's second Five-Year plan.25
A great number of infrastructure development projects in 
Vietnam are also Soviet b u ilt or assisted, including "the
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Hoabinh hydropower station (1,920 mW) - the largest in 
Southeast Asia - and related facilities, the Phalai thermal 
electric power plant (640 mW), the Chiang hydro-electric 
power project (400 mW), the Thanglong bridge over the Red 
River, and the Vietsovpetro joint organization (established to 
help explore and develop Vietnam's potentially rich oil and gas 
deposits). The projects built with Soviet assistance account for 
89 per cent of coal produced in Vietnam, 76 per cent of metal­
cutting machine tools, 100 per cent of superphosphate and 
apatite, and 35 per cent of electricity."26
The Vietnamese themselves have acknowledged the 
magnitude and importance of Soviet economic assistance, 
noting that, "the USSR has provided us with extremely valuable 
assistance. (It) has guaranteed as much as 70 tolOO per cent of 
the supplies we need of goods of utmost strategic importance, 
thus making a decisive contribution to helping us maintain 
production and stabilize our livelihood."27
By any measure, the figures listed in the above 
paragraphs are very high, and based on them alone, few can 
possibly deny the assertion that the Vietnamese are 
economically dependent on the Soviets insofar as the amount of 
aid provided is concerned. But does this assure, to a reasonable 
degree, active and meaningful influence for the "dominant" 
state in the aid relationship, in the sense of giving it an ability 
to exercise direct and substantial control over the actions of its 
"subservient" partner ?
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The precedents in international relations involving a 
superpower and a "medium" or "small" power strongly suggest 
that it does not. For example, the United States government, 
especially its State Department, has discovered that its huge 
economic and military aid programme to Israel has not turned 
the latter into a "compliant client-state" respectful of American 
interests in the Middle East.
Apologists for the United States could, of course, claim 
that the Soviet Union is a "different" kind of superpower, an 
"evil empire" which s tr ic t ly  enforces its will on those 
dependent on it. Again - without entering into a debate about 
whether it is "evil" or not - the record suggests otherwise. The 
so-called "dependent" states almost invariably had an ulterior 
motive for appearing to be a "client" of the Soviet Union, 
namely, to secure military supplies from it against an 
adversary. But the Soviet Union has seldom been able to exert 
active and meaningful influence on them - in the way most 
automatically assume it can - simply because of this.
Anwar Sadat's Egypt in its "war of attrition" against Israel 
was a paradigm case. Military and economic aid did not 
prevent Sadat from ordering the Soviets out on 18 July 1972.28 
Instead, it turned out to be a case of the "tail wagging the dog" 
when the Soviets had to airlift emergency military supplies to 
Egypt in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.29 Ultimately, even 
this did not stop him from withdrawing naval facilities and 
abrogating the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with 
the Soviets in March 1976.30
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Significantly, the reason for Sadat's actions was because 
of Soviet pressure on Egypt to clear part of its massive debt : 
the Soviets had refused to accept a moratorium on the debt, 
and "demanded interest on debts for mili tary supplies."3i As 
Sadat poin tedly  remarked when present ing  the draft  bill 
abrogating the treaty to the Egyptian Parliament on 14 March, 
"the Soviet Union wishes to exert  m i l i t a ry  and economic 
pressure on us...in order to force us to go on our knees before 
it. I shall never go on my knees to anyone. I go on my knees 
only to God...If this is their concept of a friendship treaty,...the 
document is nothing more than a scrap of paper."32
Then there was Somalia, a poor Third World country 
much like Vietnam, which, up unti l  1977, was also heavily 
dependent on Soviet aid.33 it too was in a tense situation : a 
face-off against Ethiopia over the Territories of the Afars and 
Issas (the former French Somali land). 34 in July 1974, it had 
signed a Treaty of F r i endsh ip  and Cooperation with the 
Soviets.33 which was subsequent ly ratified in October.36 in 
mid-1975 .  there  was alarm in the West over what were 
claimed to be Soviet mi l i tary facili t ies at the Somali Red Sea 
port of Berbera.37 Although these fears turned out to be true,38 
neither did this nor Somalia's "aid-dependency" and grinding 
poverty stop it from expelling the Soviets in November 1977 
and abrogating the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
with them.39
While not suggesting that the Vietnamese are about to 
abrogate the i r  own t r ea ty  wi th the Soviets, the above 
s imi la r i t ie s  with the posi t ion of Vietnam today - which
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strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union in the late 1970s 
because of Chinese h o s til ity  over Kampuchea40 - make 
assumptions about "great" Soviet influence in Hanoi based 
mainly on the la tte r’s "aid-dependency" highly suspect. 
Therefore, what is needed is a much firmer basis than the one­
sided aid relationship on which to build a case - if one exists - 
for a critical Soviet role in the Vietnamese reforms.
For a start, there are some striking similarities between 
the reforms in Vietnam and those in the Soviet Union. Basically, 
the reforms in both countries had involved a certain degree of 
decentralization to promote effic iency and in itia tive , and 
encouragement for the setting up of lim ited kinds of private 
enterprises based on the profit motive. Prima facie, these could 
suggest a significant influencing role for the Soviets over the 
Vietnamese. But on deeper reflection, there are two basic flaws 
in this.
First, the Vietnamese were already experimenting with 
the abovementioned types of reforms before Gorbachev started 
his programme of perestroika in the Soviet Union and CMEA.41 
At the sixth plenum of the Fourth Congress in September 1979, 
the CPV leadership had made a firm  decision to liberalize the 
economy, starting the reversal away from over-centralized 
planning by recognizing the stifling  effect it had on economic 
growth. A 22 October 1979 Nhan Dan editorial, reflecting the 
dominant views at the sixth plenum (Fourth Congress), had 
criticized central planning as follows, “The simple mentality of 
wanting to immediately control all production and distribution 
by adm inistrative laws and regulations and elim inating
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everything else, not allowing anyone to do anything outside of 
nationalized industries and cooperatives, forbidding all forms 
of exchange, can only lead to an economic situation of poverty 
and slow growth."42
The importance of rewarding the individual to improve 
economic efficiency and productivity was also officially 
recognized in 1979. As put by the Party daily Nhan Dan. "The 
policy of providing material benefits is formulated on the basis 
of the "to each according to his work" principle, which ensures 
that each worker, in proportion to the amount and quality of 
his work, will receive an appropriate quantity of products 
created so as to compensate him for his labour. According to 
this principle, those who put in more and better work will be 
given more and better compensation than others."43 As a 
result, a certain degree of economic responsibility was already 
being devolved to the provinces and districts in Vietnam in the 
late 1970s.44 The most notable outcome of all these reform 
measures was the introduction of the "output contract" system 
for farming cooperatives in 1980, which encapsulated the 
reform principles of the sixth plenum (Fourth Congress) by 
leaving basic economic decision-making to the cooperatives and 
rewarding efficiency through the profit motive 45
Second, the similarities could be no more than mere 
coincidence, perhaps of similar problems (inefficiency and 
unresponsiveness to changing economic conditions brought 
about by the inherent limitations and weaknesses of central 
planning) needing similar solutions (decentralization to 
encourage enterprise and initiative).46 The patent absurdity of
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assuming that similarity translates into acceptable proof of 
active and meaningful influence can be shown by drawing a 
parallel between the reforms in the Soviet Union and China, 
which are also quite similar. Although not an entirely apt 
analogy - because the Vietnamese are dependent on the 
Soviets for aid, while the Soviets are not with respect to China - 
the point is i l lustrated when it is realized that there are 
probably no political analysts who would support the 
contention that it was the Chinese who pressured Gorbachev, in 
the sense of actively intervening, into reforming the Soviet 
economy.47
These two flaws negate any attempts at establishing the 
importance of the Soviet role in Vietnam's economic reforms 
based on similarities alone. Perhaps a more convincing case 
would be to examine how closely the Vietnamese reforms are 
structured along the lines of the organizational reforms 
espoused by Gorbachev for the CME A .
Under Gorbachev, the CMEA's 1971 long-term 
programme of integration, that is, the Complex Programme for 
Further Improvement of Socialist Economic Integration, and the 
Long-Term Target Programmes (LTTP) of cooperation and 
specialization which resulted from it have been more or less 
replaced by a Long-Term Programme of Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation launched in December 1985.48 The 
latter scheme emphasizes the role of relatively autonomous 
joint ventures and direct links between enterprises of different 
CMEA countries.49 in essence, "(t)he core of the CMEA system 
will continue to be intergovernmental bilateral agreements ;
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but the gaps in its inflexible structure should, at least in theory, 
be increasingly filled with autonomous initiative by 
enterprises."50 The deputy-chairman of the USSR Council of 
Ministers, Vladimir Kamentsev, had said that such enterprises 
will be the "priority growth area in the country's cooperation 
with other socialist countries."5i
There is strong evidence that the Vietnamese are indeed 
reforming their economy to conform to these Soviet 
prescriptions for the CMEA. During a November 1987 working 
visit to Vietnam by a Soviet government delegation led by V. K. 
Gusev, a number of agreements were signed laying the 
groundwork for the new forms of CMEA economic 
cooperation.52 These included an agreement on the basic 
principles for the creation of joint ventures and direct relations 
between enterprises of the two countries.53 The most basic of 
these principles was that the participating enterprises were to 
have a high degree of independence in economic decision­
making. This was guaranteed in Articles 1 and 9 of the 
agreement reprinted in the 23 November 1987 issue of Nhan 
Dan. Article 1 read, "Joint enterprises will conduct their 
business operations on the basis of total economic accounting 
for their self-procured and self-replenished funds, including 
foreign exchange and independent balance sheets '^  ; whereas 
Article 9 stated that, "Joint enterprises carry out their activities 
on the basis of short-term and long-term plans developed and 
adopted by themselves....State organs of the host country shall 
not establish obligatory tasks and plans for joint enterprises."55
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Subsequently, in December 1987, Vietnam's Council of 
Ministers issued decision No. 217-HDBT setting up a "new 
management mechanism" for state enterprises. Among its basic 
principles were that "the state must recognize and encourage 
direct relations among state-operated economic units 
themselves, as well as between state-operated economic units 
and units of other economic components, and (those) in foreign 
coun tr ies '^  ; and that (s)tate organs should not interfere 
directly in the daily activities of (these) enterprises...(so as to 
create) the environment and ensur(e) favourable conditions for 
(them) to exercise their right to autonomy in production and
business."57
The Soviets have also been moving to get the CMEA 
member-states to achieve a higher degree of specialization 
within the organization. At the special economic summit of the 
CMEA from 12-14 June 1984 in Moscow - the first in 15 years 
- this was one of the main items on the agenda.58 in this 
context, the role envisaged by the Soviets for Vietnam is that of 
a producer of primary goods, mainly light industrial products 
and farm produce for the CMEA, and in particular, for the 
Soviet Union's Far East and Siberian regions.
Ligachev's speech to the CPV's Sixth Congress hinted at 
this when he said, "some branches of the light and foodstuffs 
industry, production facilities for consumer goods and the 
arranging of direct trading and economic links with regions of 
Siberia and the Soviet Far East may...become an important area 
of our cooperation."59 in other references to Vietnam's 
cooperation with the USSR, this message has been more b lun t:
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it has been stressed that a "special role is given to 
strengthening direct ties between the USSR's Far Eastern 
regions and the SRV (Socialist Republic of Vietnam), to taking 
appropriate steps to organize exports of farm produce to these 
regions"60 ; and that "(p)roceeding along lines of mutual 
benefit...(t)he Soviet Far East, geographically closer to Vietnam 
than any other region of the USSR, will offer a capacious 
market for Vietnamese raw and processed fruits  and 
vegetables."61
Here again, Vietnam seem to be complying with Soviet 
wishes. The Economic Report of the Sixth Party Congress 
"reversed earlier economic priorities which laid stress on the 
development of heavy industries" to put more emphasis on 
agriculture.62 Delivered by the Chairman of the State Planning 
Commission Vo Van Kiet, it read. "In the years ahead, we will 
really consider agriculture the foremost battle front...The 
primary and main orientation for heavy industry in this stage 
is to support agriculture and light industry on a proper scale 
and at an appropriate technical level."63 The Political Report of 
the Sixth Congress also added that, "agriculture, forestry and 
fish(ery) products occupy the most important place in the 
export s tructure of the coming years....(and) (w)e are 
determined to organize well the export of farm products to the 
Far East region of the Soviet Union."6^
Furthermore, in finalizing the coordination of their state 
economic plans, the Vietnamese agreed that in return for 
Soviet aid and assistance, "Vietnam will increase the volume of 
its exports to the Soviet Union, first of all farm produce."65 This
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was repeated in the protocols Vietnam signed with the other 
CMEA countries on coordinating their current Five-Year (1986 - 
90) state economic plans.66 In general, the Vietnamese 
promised increased exports of primary farm produce, raw 
materials and light industrial goods in return for technical and 
financial assistance in building up the country’s industrial 
base.67
However, does Vietnam’s adoption of these aspects of 
Gorbachev's perestroika  programme for the CMEA make 
assertions about active and meaningful influence in Hanoi an 
immediate truism ? Probably not. because all that the above 
points positively showed is that Vietnam is increasing economic 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and the CMEA countries. 
There is nothing unusual about this, since it is a member-state 
of the CMEA and the Soviet Union is clearly its most important 
trading partner. During the period from 1976 to 1980, overall 
trade between the two countries had risen at an average 
annual rate of 24.3 per cent.68 For the period 1981 to 1984, it 
went up by 41.5 per cent as compared to the preceding five 
years.69 As to Soviets exports to and imports from Vietnam, 
they rose by 38.6 and 54.2 per cent respectively.70 By the mid- 
1980s, the Soviet Union accounted for two-thirds of Vietnam's 
total foreign trade turnover.71 In the words of the Vietnamese, 
"(t)he USSR is the key market for our imports and exports. In 
1986, 83 per cent of the value of our imports came from the 
socialist countries, with the USSR accounting for 70 per cent of 
that figure. The USSR imported 65 per cent of the value of the 
products we exported to the socialist market."72
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Viewed from these perspectives - that is, Vietnam's 
membership in the CMEA and its extensive trade links with the 
Soviet Union - it is entirely plausible that the Vietnamese are 
following Soviet advice on economic reforms of their own 
volition, because to do so is in Vietnam's best interests. For 
example, the joint ventures and direct contacts could provide 
training for local personnel and access to technology to help 
develop Vietnam's domestic industries which might otherwise 
be difficult to obtain ; while concentrating on farm exports to 
the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries to pay for 
their technical and financial assistance makes sound economic 
sense, since agriculture is the dominant sector in Vietnam's 
economy. It consistently accounted for over 40 per cent of the 
total produced national income, the highest of all sectors in the 
economy,73 with 72.4 per cent of the estimated active labour 
force in mid-1984 being employed there.7^
Only if it can be further proven that the Vietnamese had 
no choice, and were pressured into adopting the CMEA 
organizational reforms reluctantly, would there be a solid basis 
to make educated guesses about the degree to which the 
Soviets may exercise active and meaningful influence in 
Vietnam.
In this respect, the strength of any arguments for or 
against the Soviet Union having a critical role in the economic 
reforms in Vietnam - and possibly rising influence among that 
country's new leadership - needs to be corroborated or 
tempered by what is known about the kind of relationship the 
Soviets and Vietnamese have had with each other historically
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and in more contemporary times, and by any logical inferences 
that one could make from them.
One very relevant point here is that the Soviet- 
Vietnamese relationship had never been easy or comfortable : 
behind the almost mandatory declarations of "friendship and 
cooperation" in their present-day official communiques, there 
is a long history of Soviet betrayal, neglect or compromise of 
the Vietnamese communists’ interests. As listed by Leif 
Rosenberger, when the Party was founded in 1930, the Soviets 
were more or less indifferent. In the 1930s and early 1940s, 
they failed to support even verbally the Vietnamese 
communists' struggle against colonial France, recognizing Ho Chi 
Minh's 1945 declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV) only in 1950. The DRV then had to wait two years to 
send its first ambassador to the Soviet Union in April 1952. 
Later, in 1948 and 1951. the Soviets neither supported nor 
lobbied on behalf of the DRV when the latter applied for 
membership in the UN ; instead, they supported the Geneva 
cease-fire in 1954 that resulted in the partitioning of Vietnam 
at the 17th parallel, and in 1956 proposed that both North and 
South be admitted to the UN. And when the US mined Haiphong 
Harbour in 1972, Brezhnev turned a blind eye so as not to 
jeopardize the upcoming May US-Soviet summit, greeting 
President Nixon warmly when he arrived 75
The recent ■"close"' ties between the two countries were in 
fact fostered out of mutual hostility towards China in the late 
1970s, not out of mutual trust.76 The deterioration of Sino- 
Vietnamese relations and rising hostility over Kampuchea and
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the Hoa" (Chinese living in Vietnam) issue,77 plus U.S. delay in 
normalizing relations and providing aid to Vietnam during its 
food crisis of 1978 78 more or less forced a reluctant Hanoi into 
signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets 
on 3 July 1978 70 After the treaty was signed, the then Premier 
Pham Van Dong hinted to a visiting American delegation at 
how uncomfortable the Vietnamese were with it. Probably in 
the hope that the Americans would take it as a signal to 
normalize relations, he told them, "Whenever in our four- 
thousand-year history Vietnam has been dependent on one 
large friend, it has been a disaster for us."80
Vietnam's membership in the CMEA, approved at a 
meeting of the member-states in Bucharest in June 1978, also 
seems to have been pushed through in haste, with most of the 
other member-states not notified in advance of its application 
to join.81 In fact, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co 
Thach bluntly told an interviewer that, "We became a full 
member of Comecon after the break-off with China. We would 
not be a member if it were not for that."82
Today, the stress and strain in the "fraternal" relations 
between Vietnam and the Soviet Union remain, the latest 
source of tension being Moscow's attempt at a show of "even- 
handedness" vis-a-vis Hanoi and Beijing in their clashes over 
the Spratley Islands and on the Kampuchea issue.88 There must 
be a fear among the Vietnamese leadership that the Soviets 
may repeat the many betrayals of the past for their own selfish 
interests,84 this time in order to normalize relations with 
China.85
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Another significant historical point is that Vietnam is 
unlike any of the Eastern European states, with the exception of 
Yugoslavia and Albania, in that its communist revolution was 
largely indigenous.86 It was dependent on the Soviet Union and 
China only to the extent that it was assisted by them through 
the provision of war materiel and moral support.
Vietnam is in fact more akin to the Soviet Union than the 
East European states in the sense of having its own "sphere of 
influence“87 : like the Soviets in Eastern Europe, Vietnam has 
troops on foreign territories adjacent to it, namely the other 
two Indochinese states, plus the military power to back up its 
claim. It is generally accepted that Vietnam now has between 
100 and 150.000 soldiers in Kampuchea. In Laos, it has four 
divisions and various support staff, totalling an estimated 
50,000 troops. The Vietnam People’s Army (VP A) units are also 
assigned to internal security duties and construction work in 
Laos.88 And despite the ending of the Second Indochina war in 
1975. Vietnam's regular armed forces rose from 615.000 in 
1978 to 1,155.000 in 1986, an increase of 88 per cent, the 
highest rate of growth of military power in Southeast Asia.8^  
Consequently, the VP A now has the fifth largest military force 
in the world, behind only those of the Soviet Union, China, the 
United States and India. In addition to regular troops of the 
VPA (1.1 million), Vietnam has 3 million trained reserves, a 
Border Defence Force of 60,000 and various paramilitary 
groups totalling 1.5 million. The overall number of people 
involved in the military is therefore slightly above 5 million, or 
8 per cent of the country's total population.9°
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Two corresponding inferences can be drawn from the 
above points. First, although the extent of the Soviets' 
involvement in Vietnam's economy today is vast, there is likely 
to be a high degree of Vietnamese distrust  for them ; and 
second, it should come as no surprise that the Vietnamese are 
highly nationalistic, with little inclination to regard themselves 
as being on the "periphery" of the "socialist revolution ", 
preferring instead to be at the "centre".91
Keeping in mind that the "new" leaders in Vietnam are 
not "new" in the true sense of the word - they are only "new" 
relative to those who have "retired"92 - it is unlikely that their 
perception of the Soviets, and how they would respond to any 
Soviet pressure, would exist in a historical vacuum. More likely, 
they would have been conditioned by their prior experiences 
with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, having being part of an 
indigenous revolution - in a country which can only be 
regarded as the regional military power in Southeast Asia aside 
from Indonesia - they are also likely to be at least as 
nationalistic as their predecessors.
From these inferences, it could be argued that it is highly 
improbable - though not absolutely impossible - that the 
Vietnamese leaders would meekly allow the Soviets to tell 
them what to do with respect to how their country's reforms 
should proceed, if these do not mesh with their  own 
perceptions of Vietnam's self-interest.
The immediate response to this would be to ask, "Do they 
have the luxury of ignoring Soviet economic "advice", even if
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they were against it ?" Given Vietnam's "aid-dependency", the 
Soviets could threaten a withdrawal of aid to force it into 
accepting their instructions.
The reply to this - as noted earlier - is that the record of 
both superpowers in general strongly suggest that giving 
massive amounts of economic and military aid is seldom 
synonymous with acquiring active and meaningful influence 
over the actions of the "dependent" state. In Vietnam's case, 
the efficacy of such threats in forcing Hanoi's hand may not be 
as real as it seems for the following three reasons.
First, the Vietnamese are not without their own 
"bargaining chips" with the Soviets - the base facilities at 
Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet vessels and surface ships 
make regular visits to Cam Ranh Bay, and their reconnaissance 
aircraft operating from Danang and Cam Ranh Airfield spy on 
U.S. naval activities in the South China Sea.93 These facilities 
also enable them to watch Chinese ships and southern shore 
installations.94 How important these facilities are to the Soviets 
is open to debate, but if they can help it, the Soviets would 
probably not want to lose their access to them.
Second, the Soviets are also likely to want to retain some 
kind of "foothold" in Indochina, where Vietnam is the dominant 
power. As illustrated by the "Pen Sovan affair",95 even though 
most of the mili tary hardware that makes Vietnam's 
domination of Kampuchea and Laos possible is Soviet- 
supplied, 96 the strength of the Soviet position there is still
61
paradoxically dependent to a certain degree on maintaining the 
goodwill of the Vietnamese.
However, it should be noted in passing that the fall of Pen 
Sovan could also have been the result of an internal power 
struggle. According to Pom Delis, who defected to Thailand and 
who was the secretary and "minor" wife of a top minister (Ros 
Samay) in the Heng Samrin Cabinet. Pen Sovan was regarded as 
being more trustworthy than Heng Samrin because of the 
former's Vietnamese army training and Vietnamese wife ; and 
that Pen Sovan was to have replaced Heng Samrin as the head
of the regime.97
Third, there is a precedent for the Vietnamese leadership 
giving up economic aid. at a time when the country desperately 
needed it. for what it considered to be a more important 
priority - security. The reference here is to the invasion of 
Kampuchea in late 1978. when the Vietnamese economy was 
undergoing a serious crisis. The Party leaders then not only put 
up with armed hostility from China to get rid of the anti- 
Vietnamese Pol Pot regime, but also gave up substantial 
amounts of economic aid from the Chinese for the higher 
priority  of security.98 Their independence of action, like 
security, is likely to enjoy higher priority than economic aid. In 
fact, independence being one of the two aims that formed the 
basis of the Party's support and legitimacy - as discussed in 
Chapter One - it is probably the top priority of the Vietnamese. 
For example, one of the three qualities of the traditional ideal 
Vietnamese ruler is the ability to maintain the country's
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independence from domination by its long-time adversary in 
the North, namely, China00
i This strong sense of independence of the Politburo, both 
"old" and "new", makes it highly unlikely that it would give in 
to economic blackmail by the Soviets. To suggestions that 
Vietnam may be losing its sovereignty to Moscow, the then 
Premier Pham Van Dong asked rhetorically, "Does anyone truly 
believe that after having paid such an immense price for our 
freedom in blood, sweat and tears, we would hand over that 
newly won independence to someone else? " 100
The country's "new" leader, Nguyen Van Linh, shows no 
sign of being any less independent-minded than his 
predecessors. While recognizing that Soviet aid is important, he 
had qualified it with a call not to become dependent. "The new 
development of Vietnamese-Soviet co-operation epitomizes the 
CPV's view that Soviet cooperation and assistance is the core of 
Vietnam's foreign economic strategy and an important factor in 
socialist construction in this country...(However), it is necessary 
to eliminate resolutely the idea of depending or relying on 
others. " 101
Perhaps the question to ask then is not whether the 
Vietnamese had the luxury of ignoring Soviet advice, but what 
made them amenable to it in the first place. In this respect, the 
reasons could have been internal, as discussed in Chapter One, 
and not so much because of Soviet pressure.
It may of course be speculated that the Gorbachev 
leadership assisted the "reformers" in removing the "old"
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leaders, causing them to be beholden to the Soviets for their 
positions. In fact, two leaders whom the Soviets could have had 
good reasons to want removed, Truong Chinh and Pham Van 
Dong, did in fact end up being "retired", as noted in Chapter 
One. Chinh is reputed to be "pro-Chinese",102 and it is 
speculated that the Gorbachev leadership did not favour him as 
Party leader after Le Duan's death because of his 
"conservative" views on economic reforms. 103 In Dong's case, he 
had been critical before of Soviet reluctance to grant Vietnam 
carte blanche access to economic aid. The Soviets had initially 
refused to make any firm commitment to Vietnam's third Five- 
Year plan (1981- 83) during the run-up to the CPV's Fifth 
National Party Congress in 1982.1(M Subsequently, at the Fifth 
Party Congress, he openly chided them for treating Vietnam “in 
a subservient way".105
Contrast this with the warm praise the "new" Vietnamese 
leadership is currently giving to the Soviets. For example, an 
article written by the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co 
Thach, entitled "The Cornerstone of Vietnam's Foreign Policy", 
was unreserved in its praise for the Soviet Union, "Our 
principled policy toward the Soviet Union is...based on the 
direct role played by the Soviet people in the revolutionary 
cause of our people. It may be said that had it not been for the 
Russian October Revolution, the Indochinese Communist Party 
of Vietnam, the predecessor of the present Communist Party of 
Vietnam, would not have come into existence. Had it not been 
for the victory of the Soviet Red Army over German facism and 
Japanese militarism, the August Revolution would not have
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triumphed in Vietnam in 1945. Had it not been for the Soviet 
Union, Vietnam could not have defeated French colonialism, 
U.S. imperialism and international reaction, and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam could not have come into existence."106
From this startling change in attitude towards the 
Soviets, it could be suggested that the new leadership "owes" 
something - besides the massive amount of economic aid - to 
the former. This "something" could have involved strong Soviet 
objection to the confirmation of Chinh as the Party Secretary- 
General at the Sixth Congress, and support for the removal of 
Dong, which would have vitiated the position of the "old guard" 
in the Politburo /Tone accepts the premise that Soviet aid gave 
them great influence over the Vietnamese.
But as pointed out twice already, aid and influence are 
seldom synonymous with each other, and arguments that the 
"new" leadership is Soviet "influenced" are in fact quite 
weak.107 That the Soviets had a major role in the most recent 
leadership changes in Vietnam - because of the latter's "aid- 
dependency" - can be countered by pointing to an earlier 
resignation of Truong Chinh in 1956. Vietnam was not as 
dependent on the Soviets then, as it was also receiving support 
from the Chinese. Yet, the failure of the harsh agricultural 
collectivization drive of 1953 - 56 forced Chinh to resign from 
his position as Party Secretary-General.108 This precedent 
showed that internal accountability is an important factor in 
the fall of leaders, and can outweigh external pressures.
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Moreover, even conceding that Soviet support was 
needed by the “reformers" to remove the "old guard" in any 
"power struggle", it does not mean that the "new" leadership is 
under Soviet "influence". It could be that the “new" leaders 
"used" the Soviets and not the other way round, in that 
"reformers" may have exploited Soviet unhappiness at the way 
their aid was being wasted to argue against and undermine the 
position of the "old" leaders within the Politburo, without 
feeling obligated to the Soviets in anyway.
As for their effusive praise for the Soviet Union, there is 
every possibility that it is part of an elaborate "game" to re­
assure the Soviets so as to keep access to aid open, the latter 
knowing very wel 1 that there is no way to "enforce" Vietnam’s 
"loyalty and friendship" - because of geography - as they could 
in Eastern Europe. But how sincere the Vietnamese really are in 
their "fraternal" relations with the Soviets is open to question.
In fact, active and meaningful Soviet influence in the 
Vietnamese reforms seems to be contradicted by the type of 
economists who are rising to prominence in their wake. Even 
though the Soviets are training a number of Vietnamese 
economists,l°9 two of the most important today - Luu Van Dat 
and Nguyen Xuan Oanh - are Western-educated. Dat is a 
French-trained economist and lawyer who headed the 
committee which drafted the new foreign investment law,110 
whereas Oanh is a Harvard-trained economist111 who, as a 
member of the SRV (Socialist Republic of Vietnam) National 
Assembly, is now a key economic adviser to the communist 
government.112 Oanh also played a crucial role in drafting the
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new foreign investment law passed by the National Assembly 
on 29 December 1987,113 and was recently appointed vice- 
chairman of a newly established commercial bank in 
Vietnam.114
Therefore, on balancing all the arguments and evidence 
presented in this chapter, what may be claimed as irrefutable 
about the Soviet role in Vietnam's reforms is this : while the 
Vietnamese' adoption of the structural changes espoused by 
the Soviets for the CMEA makes it undeniable that the Soviets 
did influence some aspects of Vietnam's economic reforms, 
contradictory evidence (for example, the rise of Western- 
educated economists), the fact that the Vietnamese have some 
bargaining power with the Soviets (base facilities and the 
latter's position in the Indochina peninsula), plus the lessons of 
history suggest caution against assigning an overbearing, that 
is, critical role for the Soviets just because Vietnam is 
dependent on them for aid.
In the final analysis, the Vietnamese' strong sense of 
independence means that it is unlikely that the Soviets can 
"push" them into reforms if they are not willing ; neither it is 
likely that the Soviets can “install" leaders of their choice in 
Hanoi. The Vietnamese, having publicly conceded that Soviet 
aid had been wasted and that the goods exported to the Soviet 
Union were lacking in many respects, accept the need for 
Soviet aid to be used more e f f i c i en t ly . 1^  To the extent of 
rectifying these shortcomings, they would probably tolerate 
Soviet instructions about how they should reform their 
economy. But anything beyond that would have to involve a
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high degree of voluntary action by the Vietnamese themselves. 
As pointed out earlier, just because they are following Soviet 
advice does not necessari ly mean that they were "forced" into 
it by the Soviets. Instead, they could have been "forced" into it 
by internal factors.
This last point provides the key to deciding how critical 
the Soviet role really is in the Vietnamese reform process. It 
will be dealt with in the concluding chapter which now follows.
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Conclusion : A New Legitimacy ?
In Chapter Two, it was established that the Soviets were 
exerting pressure on the Vietnamese to carry out reforms, and 
that they have had an important influence because of the very 
clearly documented link between the perestroika-inäuceö 
organizational reforms in the CMEA and some aspects of the 
Vietnamese reforms, namely, the establishment of joint 
ventures and direct links between enterprises in the two 
countries, and Vietnam's apparent agreement to accept 
economic specialization within the framework proposed by 
Gorbachev.
But the question of how critical the Soviet role was in the 
overall fabric of the Vietnamese reform process hinged on an 
entirely separate issue : could the Soviets have actually forced 
the Vietnamese leadership, "old" or "new", into accepting their 
economic "recommendations" if it had not been willing ?
The argument developed in Chapter Two was that the 
Soviets could not. In this respect, the key and necessary factor 
for the leadership's current acceptance of the Soviet input 
seems to be internal.
A hidden premise of Chapter One was that the CPV, 
despite being the only political party in Vietnam, is still 
accountable to a certain degree to its own cadres and "the 
masses" that supported it throughout the war-years. The 
examination revealed that the economic mess wrought by the 
inability of the "old guard" to deal with the issue of post-War 
reconstruction had eroded the Party's legitimacy - defined as
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"the capacity of (a) system to engender and maintain the belief 
that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate 
ones of the society (in which they are found)" - to a point 
where the leaders held responsible for it were effectively 
dismissed at the watershed Sixth Party Congress for their 
incompetence. The "new" leaders who replaced them must now 
make the Party "appropriate" again by taking measures to 
revitalize the economy and "clean up" the system, or most 
probably face the same fate at future Congresses.
Where then does the Soviet role fit in ? It seems to be 
that of a catalyst, but one which is still largely dependent on 
the internal situation in Vietnam being "right" before it can be 
effective. The erosion of legitimacy and its attendant 
consequences, especially the threat to the positions of Party 
leaders, created the conditions necessary for the Vietnamese 
leadership to accept Soviet pressures for reforms. In a way, one 
could say that the internal need for reforms to make the Party 
"appropriate" again had "softened" the highly nationalistic and 
independent-minded leaders to external pressure. Soviet 
pressure in turn made it easier for internal reforms by adding 
an extra dimension to the forces of change, thus buttressing the 
arguments of the "reformers" within the Vietnamese Politburo.
Note that this is entirely different from saying that it was 
Soviet pressure that made internal reforms necessary, which 
would then presume a critical role for the Soviets. The 
interpretation given here is that this was not the case : if the 
internal factor had been missing, or to put it in another way, if 
the Vietnamese leadership did not see the Soviet-prescribed
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reforms as serving the ir own interests f irs t and foremost, 
probably no amount of Soviet pressure would have mattered in 
accelerating the pace of the reforms.
In other words, although the Soviet role was important, it 
was not c ritica l in the sense defined in the Introduction, 
namely that "had it not been for Soviet intervention, the 
Vietnamese by themselves would not have carried out reforms 
in the way or at the pace that they did and are doing, nor 
would the "reformers" have risen within the hierarchy of the 
Party". Considering the very real threat to the leaders' positions 
from w ith in, unless one holds to the belief that communist 
politicians are not concerned about maintaining their personal 
power - a far-fetched and unlikely proposition - a strong case 
can be made that as the economic crises deepen, the internal 
pressures for reforms would still have proved irresistible, with 
or without Soviet pressure.
From the above explanation, the answer to the question 
posed in the title  of the sub-thesis - "The critical importance 
of the Soviet role in Vietnam's economic reforms : fact or 
fallacy ?" - is that it is neither fact nor fallacy. Instead, it is a 
half-truth : while one cannot deny the importance of the Soviet 
role in that it did influence some aspects of the Vietnamese 
reforms and added to the pressures for change, neither can one 
assume that if the internal situation had not been what it had 
been, the Soviet role would have made a significant difference.
In this sense, one may speak of a "new legitimacy" in 
Vietnam today. The reforms represent more than just efforts at
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reviving the country's moribund economy. They carry a deeper 
implication for the politics of Vietnam as well : the move away 
from the theme of independence to achieving the goals of 
socialism as the basis of a "new legitimacy" for the Party.
Although independence will continue to remain central, 
the stress is now shifting perceptibly to trying to complete the 
promised "socialist revolution". As Vo Van Kiet, one of the so- 
called "reformers", had already said, "taking pride in the past 
does not mean that we cling to it like a cloak to cover our 
present weaknesses...and use (its) halo...as an ornament."1 
These words were spoken with reference to the economic crises 
("our present weaknesses"), implying that the CPV could no 
longer rely on its victories in the independence struggles ("the 
past") for its current legitimacy.
However, there is another more subtle sense in which the 
words of Kiet apply : the need to fill the growing "legitimacy- 
vacuum" created by the accelerating death rate of top Party 
members, that is, those people who drew their "right to rule" 
most directly from the independence struggles.
In 1985. three of them had passed away : they were 
Nguyen Duy Trinh, in April, the ex-head of the State Planning 
Commission, ex-Foreign Minister and the Party Central 
Committee's number three secretary in the late 1970s ; Xuan 
Thuy, in June, the ex-Foreign Minister and ex-secretary for 
international relations in the Central Committee ; and Nguyen 
Due Thuan, in October, then number two in the important 
Central Committee Organization Department.2
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Another five followed in 1986, including the death of the 
Party Secretary-General Le Duan on 10 July. The other four 
who died were Trinh Dinh Thao, in March, a member of the 
Vietnam Fatherland Front Presidium and an important figure 
in South Vietnamese politics ; Hoang Van Thai, in July, a 
general, ex-North Vietnamese commander in South Vietnam 
and deputy Minister of National Defence ; Ta Quang, in August, 
an ex-Minister of Higher Education ; and Tran Quoc, in 
September, an ex-Minister of the Interior and ex-Politburo 
member.3
In March 1988, Pham Hung, who was just appointed 
Premier at the June 1987 National Assembly, died of a heart 
attack.4 In the same month, the funerals of two other high- 
level Party members were announced : Nguyen Xuan Linh, a 
former member and secretary of the National Assembly 
Standing Committee5 ; and Le Quang Ba, who joined the 
Indochinese Communist Party in May 1932 and was the former 
commander of the Hanoi military region, a major-general of the 
Viet Bac military region, a member of the Vietnam Fatherland 
Front Presidium, head of the Central Committee of Nationalities 
and Chairman of the Government Commission of Nationalities.6
A study by Carlyle Thayer also found that the percentage 
of the older revolutionaries in the Central Committee is 
dwindling rapidly. At the Third Party Congress in I960, those 
elected in 1931. which he termed the “original revolutionary 
generation", made up 63 per cent of all members ; at the Fourth 
Congress in 1976, they had shrunk to just 20 per cen t ; at the 
Fifth Congress in 1982, the figure fell to 11 per cent; and at the
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Sixth Congress in 1986, it declined even further to 3 per cent.7 
Also declining rapidly are the numbers of those who joined the 
Central Committee in I960. In I960, they represented 37 per 
cent of the total full membership ; in 1976, 26 per cent ; in 
1982, 10 per cent; and in 1986, just 3 per cent.8
The most important consequence of the accelerating 
death rate and precipitous drop in numbers of the 
revolutionary generation at the higher echelons of the Party is 
that the CPV's legitimacy can no longer be tied primarily to the 
independence struggle in the foreseeable future, since these 
leaders are the very people most directly associated with it. As 
younger leaders rise within the Party, as they must due to the 
natural attrition among the revolutionary generation,9 and the 
economic crisis in Vietnam continues, the basis of their “right to 
rule" will inevitably be derived less from the independence 
struggle and more from their ability to deal with the economic 
problems of post-War Vietnam. They need to regain the 
confidence of "the masses" through a "new legitimacy" which 
would show that the Party can be as successful in economic 
reconstruction as it was in the independence struggle.
In conclusion, Pham Van Dong had claimed that "(t)he 
purpose of engaging in revolution is to conquer power, 
conserve power, consolidate power, and use this power to build 
a new society."10 How the newer and upcoming leaders meet 
this latest challenge will decide whether the promise of a "new 
society" is fulfilled, and most important of all. if the revolution 
was all in vain. Success would give the Party a "new legitimacy"
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; failure would almost certainly plunge it deeper into what can 
only be termed as its current "crisis of legitimacy".
tQuoted from David W. P. Elliot. "Waiting for the East Wind : Revolution 
and Social Change in Modern Vietnam", The Vietnam Forum. No. 9. 
Winter-Spring 1987, p. 248.
Economist  Intelligence Unit. Quarterly Economic Review of Indochina : 
Vietnam. Laos. Cambodia. No. 1, London, 1986, p. 7.
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Change in the Party's Central Committee, 1951 - 1986". paper delivered at 
the Institute  of Development Studies, University of Sussex. September 
1985. (revised 1987 edition, obtained from Thayer), p. 10 and 15.
8ibid.. p. 11.
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